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CO-LABORATIVE	ANTHROPOLOGY:	CRAFTING	REFLEXIVITIES	EXPERIMENTALLY	
Jörg	Niewöhner	
The	Finnish	translation	of	this	piece	has	been	published	in:	
Jukka	Jouhki	and	Tytti	Steel	(2016)	Ethnologinen	tulkinta	ja	analyysi.	Kohti	avoimempaa	
tutkimusprosessia.	Ethnos,	Helsinki:	81-125.			
	
	
Introduction:	why	co-laborate?	
Anthropology	is	concerned	with	lived	sociality,	i.e.	humans	living	in	groups.	It	wants	to	understand	
how	humans	arrange	themselves	within	particular	environments	as	well	as	the	dynamics	of	these	
arrangements.	This	is	a	straightforward	research	question	–	and	a	grand	challenge.	It	is	particularly	
grand	for	social	and	cultural	anthropologists	considering	that	they	tend	to	work	alone	with	little	
more	support	than	a	field	notebook	and	a	pencil.	It	is	thus	perhaps	disciplinary	prudence	that	most	
practitioners	of	anthropology	today	consider	addressing	this	question	futile	if	not	dangerous.	The	
history	of	anthropology	shows	how	attempts	at	grand	explanations	or	narratives	remain	contingent	
and	ethically	disputable.	Practitioners	feel	more	comfortable	in	their	respective	specialty	niches.	Yet	
shying	away	from	the	question	does	not	mean	that	the	question	disappears.1	I	argue	here	that	
anthropology	should	not	be	offended	by	the	fact	that	sciences	and	publics	alike	continue	to	find	this	
question	interesting.	Instead	anthropology	should	engage	those	who	are	trying	to	find	answers	and	
convince	them	with	anthropological	reasoning	that	grand	challenges	require	humble	responses.			
Questions	about	human	group	life	and	human	nature	are	today	as	prominent	as	ever.	They	are	
answered	not	by	anthropology	but	by	the	life	and	earth	sciences.	These	heterogeneous	fields	are	
driving	our	understanding	of	life	itself	in	the	anthropocene2:	What	makes	us	us	and	how	does	that	
shape	the	planet?	In	its	core,	the	life	and	earth	sciences	are	positivist	natural	sciences	driven	by	large	
research	platforms:	genome	sequencing	and	brain	imaging	in	the	life	sciences,	remote	sensing	and	
climate,	ecological	and	integrated	assessment	modelling	in	the	earth	sciences.	Both	fields	are	
becoming	increasingly	concerned	with	the	fact	that	their	once	solely	material	research	objects	are	
embedded	in	and	indeed	infused	with	social	and	cultural	contexts	in	significant	ways.	They	extend	
invitations	to	the	social	sciences	and	particularly	to	anthropology	to	join	their	agenda:	social	and	
cultural	neuroscience	on	the	one	hand,	various	social-ecological	agendas	on	the	other.3	
	In	both	fields,	the	response	on	part	of	the	social	sciences	has	been	and	continues	to	be	in	one	of	two	
modes	of	engagement.	Critical	engagement	deconstructs	the	epistemic	regimes	to	reveal	illegitimate	
reductions	of	the	richness	of	human	group	life	to	material	quantities.	Ebullient	engagement	joins	the	
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natural	sciences	on	their	terms	and	provides	empirical	data	about	‘the	social’	to	established	positivist	
frameworks	while	redressing	social	theoretical	concerns	in	the	light	of	natural	science	findings.4	
A	third	mode	of	engagement	is	necessary.	It	is	necessary,	because	questions	of	the	nature	of	human	
nature,	sustainability	and	planetary	boundaries	are	too	fundamental	and	too	anthropological	to	be	
left	to	natural	scientific	frameworks	of	inquiry.	It	is	also	necessary,	because	at	least	some	of	the	
findings	emerging	from	the	life	and	earth	sciences	offer	rich	food	for	anthropological	inquiry	and	
theorising.	And	it	is	necessary,	because	both	fields	of	research	are	deeply	entwined	with	normative	
agendas	around	health	and	sustainability	that	are	shared	by	many	in	anthropology.	If	anthropologists	
care	about	lived	sociality	in	all	its	facets,	the	life	and	earth	sciences	are	less	Other	than	their	current	
treatment	by	anthropology	suggests.	
This	third	mode	of	engagement	is	currently	taking	shape.	In	this	chapter	I	label	it	‘co-laborative	
anthropology’.	With	co-laborative,	I	mean	temporary,	non-teleological,	joint	epistemic	work	aimed	at	
producing	disciplinary	reflexivities	not	interdisciplinary	shared	outcomes.	The	neo-logism	co-
laborative	conjures	up	associations	with	laboratory	and	experiment	as	well	as	with	labor.	It	is	distinct	
from	collaboration.	I	proceed	in	three	steps	to	argue	that		
• co-laboration	addresses	formative	anxieties	in	the	discipline;		
• co-laboration	is	nothing	new	(certainly	not	another	‘turn’)	but	anchored	through	rich	genealogies	
within	the	history	of	anthropological	research;		
• practices	of	co-laborating	help	to	diversify	existing	notions	of	reflexivity	and	critique,	thereby	
broadening	the	analytical	spectrum	and	adding	interpretative	degrees	of	freedom.		
I	conclude	by	arguing	that	the	signature	mode	of	knowledge	production	in	anthropology	–	thick,	
reflexive	inquiry	–	today	needs	to	take	co-laborative	forms	to	remain	productive	and	credible.	
	
Addressing	anxities	in	anthropology	
German	European	Ethnologists	learn	in	their	undergraduate	classes	about	two	field-related	anxieties	
that	have	been	formative	for	the	discipline.	The	underlying	topoi	are	discussed	widely	in	
anthropology	internationally,	but	–	as	far	as	I	know	–	only	the	debate	in	German	European	Ethnology	
refers	to	them	in	terms	of	anxiety.		
The	first	anxiety	is	the	anxiety	that	begins	to	befall	the	researcher	right	before	the	first	contact	with	
the	field.5	“Will	they	like	me?”	is	the	question	at	the	heart	of	this	anxiety.	Everyone	who	has	
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conducted	fieldwork	will	recognise	the	specific	feeling	before	entering	a	research	field	for	the	first	
time.	The	initial	contact	carries	the	risk	of	establishing	a	wrong-footed	relationship	with	actors	in	the	
field	that	will	stick	and	render	fieldwork	less	than	productive.	Or	–	even	worse	–	it	carries	the	risk	of	
being	refused	access	altogether.	Many	qualitative	social	science	textbooks	on	method	hence	suggest	
strategies	to	minimise	these	risks	alluding	either	to	the	ideal	of	an	invisible	observer	or	to	good	
manners	in	general.	Anthropology	has	largely	agreed	upon	a	very	different	response.	This	anxiety	
needs	to	be	taken	seriously	and	the	ethnographer	can	learn	from	it.	Fieldwork	is	always	and	
necessarily	a	social	and	interactive	encounter	that	is	structured	by	a	whole	range	of	supra-individual	
factors,	e.g.	social	fields,	discourses,	power/knowledge.	It	cannot	be	conceived	as	a	mechanical	
exercise	of	data	extraction	without	running	into	ethically	and	epistemically	questionable	territory.	
Hence	reflecting	and	perhaps	understanding	how	one	is	positioned	in	the	field	is	already	the	first	
piece	of	empirical	material.	
The	second	anxiety	is	the	anxiety	that	occurs	when	“studying	up”.6	‘Will	they	tolerate	me?’	is	the	
crucial	question.	Already	in	the	1960s,	Laura	Nader	suggested	that	studying	elites	was	an	epistemic,	
political	and	ethical	necessity.	Until	then,	fieldwork	had	been	largely	characterised	by	an	asymmetry	
of	power	and	knowledge	in	favour	of	the	researcher.	This	has	changed	with	fieldwork	in	elite	settings.	
Suddenly	informants	have	a	higher	degree	of	formal	training	than	the	researcher,	they	have	little	
time,	earn	more	money	and	are	seldom	interested	in	being	disturbed	by	the	presence	of	a	
fieldworker.	Not	gaining	access	or	being	treated	harshly	characterises	this	anxiety	and	the	response	
is	–	more	often	than	not	as	the	history	of	the	discipline	shows	–	to	look	for	a	less	powerful	field.	
Those	who	choose	to	study	up	go	the	long	road	and	study	up	on	the	field	and	its	logics.	This	reduces	
the	risk	of	looking	like	a	naïve	fool	and,	more	importantly,	it	increases	the	chances	of	being	able	to	
understand	how	the	field	operates:	the	native	language	if	you	will.	This	enables	the	researcher	to	
pursue	research	questions	to	do	with	the	‘content’	of	the	field	and	not	only	with	its	social	form.		
These	two	anxieties	are	well-known	and	their	consequences	have	been	discussed	in	depth	as	a	
matter	of	ethnographic	method.	Yet	a	third	anxiety	has	been	emerging	somewhat	more	recently,	the	
consequences	of	which	are	less	obvious.	‘Will	I	have	anything	new	to	add	to	the	native?’	is	the	crucial	
question.7	Dominic	Boyer	thinking	through	the	anthropology	of	experts	asks	this	question	taking	his	
cue	from	Ulf	Hannerz’	work	with	foreign	correspondents.8	The	scenario	they	describe	is	one	where	
the	field	under	investigation	operates	with	similar	thought	styles	as	the	anthropologist	her-	or	
himself.9	In	such	cases,	access	to	and	position	in	the	field	may	be	unproblematic	as	both	–	observer	
and	observed	–	share	many	concerns	and	perspectives.	Yet	the	problem	arises	after	the	fieldwork	
phase	when	it	turns	out	that	the	actors	in	the	field	knew	all	along	what	the	anthropologists	proudly	
present	to	them	as	their	findings.	Adding	to	the	natives’	point	of	view	becomes	difficult.	Pretending	
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to	be	able	to	may	even	seem	presumptuous	or	impudent.	Hannerz	and	Boyer	both	suggest	that	in	
such	cases	‘studying	sideways’	is	the	apt	response,	i.e.	letting	go	of	the	pretence	of	some	kind	of	
(meta)-reflexivity	and	engaging	in	more	cooperative	formats.10	I	want	to	argue	that	this	analysis	and	
this	third	anxiety	does	not	only	apply	to	an	anthropology	of	expertise	or	an	ethnography	amongst	
intellectually	like-minded	people.	Rather	anthropology	in	general	is	today	drawn	into	fields	of	
research	that	are	shaped	by	specialised	knowledges	and	by	different	forms	of	reflexivity.	
	
The	rising	importance	of	knowledge	practices	
Knowledge	practices	and	have	certainly	been	a	key	analytical	category	in	anthropology	since	its	
beginnings	in	Boasian	interest	in	language.	And	the	recent	surge	of	literature	on	the	anthropology	of	
knowledge	has	already	attracted	critics	arguing	that	‘knowledge’	is	the	new	‘culture’,	i.e.	an	
analytical	category	so	all-encompassing	that	its	use	is	compromised.11	Nevertheless,	that	people	in	
the	Global	North	thrive	and	falter	in	knowledge	societies	and	knowledge	economies	is	a	diagnosis	
not	easily	disputed.12	And	the	fact	that	transnational	and	increasingly	global	entanglements	through	
mobility	and	infrastructures	have	reached	an	unprecedented	degree	and	speed,	has	made	not	only	
anthropology	aware	that	information	and	knowledge	have	become	global	currencies.13	It	is	also	clear	
that	knowledge	is	a	currency	intricately	tied	up	with	power	and	the	micro-politics	of	discourse	and	
social	order.14	And,	lastly,	the	increasingly	socially	and	geographically	distributed	production	of	
knowledge	also	indicates	that	established	anthropological	frames	of	centre	and	periphery	may	no	
longer	be	able	to	adequately	capture	current	–	often	highly	disputed	–	flows	of	knowledge.15	
Knowledge	has	thus	become	an	established	analytical	category	in	cultural	and	social	theorising.	
From	a	different	analytical	angle,	knowing	as	a	way	of	being-in-the-world	is	an	increasingly	important	
(phenomenological)	mode	of	existence	within	the	ecologies	of	knowledge	societies.16	Thus	
anthropology	is	paying	attention	to	knowing	as	a	relational	practice,	i.e.	as	a	particular	way	of	
relating	different	kinds	of	actors	to	each	other,	which	is	qualitatively	different	from	other	relational	
practices	such	as	informing,	feeling,	recognising	or	ruling.17	
	
Reflexivity	
Many	research	fields	today	are	not	only	knowledgeable,	they	are	also	reflexive.	My	background	is	in	
science	and	technology	studies	as	well	as	ecological	and	urban	anthropology.	So	this	is	a	partial	
perspective.	Yet	I	do	believe	that	this	knowledgeable	reflexivity	is	not	restricted	to	highbrow	
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laboratories.	Rather	it	is	symptomatic	for	late	modernity18	and	the	kind	of	questions	that	
anthropology	finds	interesting	these	days.	Similar	diagnoses	have	been	made	albeit	from	different	
perspectives	and	with	a	different	purpose.	I	have	mentioned	Laura	Nader	and	Ulf	Hannerz.	Yet	the	
writing	culture	debate	was	rooted	in	similar	concerns	and	recent	advances	in	post-colonial,	critical	
whiteness	or	queer	theorising	also	diagnose	a	more	symmetrical	distribution	of	knowledge	and	
reflexivity	between	researcher	and	field.	
On	the	one	hand,	reflexive	actors	within	fields	are	great	informants	and	collaborators.	Much	of	what	
will	be	discussed	further	below	as	collaborative	ethnography	or	public	anthropology	thrives	on	just	
this	reflexivity.	It	transforms	into	partners	with	shared	goals	what	has	previously	been	discussed	as	
informants.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	reflexive	fields,	e.g.	hospitals,	science	labs,	creative	
networks,	artist	studios,	investment	banks,	NGOs,	law	and	consultancy	firms,	regulatory	bodies	or	
high	tech	industries,	are	anxiety	invoking	for	the	reasons	discussed	above.	They	are	full	of	clever	
people	and	they	often	nurture	institutionalised	forms	of	reflexivity	as	well	as	self-reflexivity.	They	
leave	the	anthropologist	with	nothing	to	add.	What	could	be	scarier	than	that?	
	
Learning	from	anxiety:	co-laboration	
I	propose	co-laborative	anthropology	as	a	necessary	mode	of	anthropology	that	responds	to	this	
anxiety	of	having	nothing	to	add.	Some	argue	that	anthropology	still	possesses	a	particular	form	of	
reflexivity	that	is	in	great	demand	in	many	fields	of	research;	that	post	writing	culture	anthropology	
is	producing	researchers	that	carry	a	remarkable	and	productive	ability	to	question	established	
categories	and	boundaries.	I	have	difficulties	with	this	opinion.	Either	it	is	meant	to	suggest	that	
anthropology	carries	a	somewhat	superior	form	of	reflexivity	compared	to	those	reflexive	subjects	
and	institutions	in	its	research	fields.	That	seems	absurd	to	me.	Or	it	is	meant	to	suggest	that	it	
possesses	a	different	kind	of	reflexivity	from	others.	Now	that	argument	I	take	seriously	but	I	would	
suggest	that	this	reflexivity	is	not	an	intellectual	or	cognitive	feature	acquired	by	the	anthropologist	
through	learning	understood	as	information	intake.	It	is	not	a	mentalistic	reflexivity	related	to	the	
anthropologist’s	training	and	experience	of	the	Other	as	so	often	suggested	from	within	
anthropology.	Rather	it	is	a	reflexivity	grounded	in	mobility	as	German	sociologist	Stefan	Hirschauer	
argues:19	mobility	between	theories,	fields,	colleagues,	institutions,	thought	styles	and	ways	of	
worlding,	if	you	will.	Reflexivity	as	mobility	is	part	of	what	co-laborative	anthropology	is	about.	It	is	
about	creating	space	and	infrastructure	for	‘reflexing’	as	a	collective	epistemic	activity.	Organising	
category	and	boundary	work,	representation,	problematisation	and	intervention,	analysis	and	
interpretation	as	a	collective	epistemic	practice	is	something	that	needs	to	happen	in	co-laboration	
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with	research	fields.	This	is	not	only	a	social	and	interactive	process.	Working	together	is	always	a	
material	and	semiotic	practice:	it	involves	technologies,	infrastructures,	material	culture	in	a	broad	
sense	and	it	is	an	embodied	practice.	In	the	following	two	sections	I	will	flesh	out	this	argument	by,	
first,	providing	genealogies	for	the	notion	of	co-laboration	suggesting	that	this	is	by	no	means	a	new	
idea	or	practice	within	anthropology.	It	is	certainly	not	some	kind	of	collaborative	turn.	Second,	I	will	
detail	four	important	facets	that	I	consider	important	about	co-laborative	practices.	
	
Informants	have	always	been	collaborators	
Ethnographic	fieldwork	is	often	portrayed	as	an	individual	accomplishment	–	not	only	in	the	history	
of	the	discipline.	Even	further:	Only	in	the	individual	exposure	to	the	Other	can	the	anthropologist	
experience	the	fundamental	alienation	from	her	or	his	own	culture	that	serves	as	the	epistemic	
moment	in	the	discipline.	Or	so	the	rather	heroic	story	is	often	told.	I	do	not	want	to	belittle	
individual	fieldwork.	The	practical,	personal	and	epistemic	accomplishments	are	often	significant.	Yet	
over	the	last	few	years,	a	different	story	has	been	emerging.	This	is	a	story	that	does	not	try	to	
diminish	the	accomplishments	of	individual	fieldwork,	but	analyses	the	processes	and	practices	of	
their	production.	Specifically,	the	role	of	the	local	informant	is	under	investigation.	It	appears	that	
many	of	these	informants	were	much	more	than	mere	translators	or	local	brokers	of	contacts	and	
information.	In	the	language	of	science	and	technology	studies:	They	were	mediators	rather	than	
mere	intermediaries.20	Information	did	not	simply	pass	through	them	unchanged	from	the	‘local	
culture’	to	the	interpreting	anthropologist.	Rather	informants	were	active	collaborators	in	joint	
knowledge	production.	The	different	strands	of	American,	British	and	French	cultural	and	social	
anthropology	as	well	as	European	Ethnology	would	really	need	to	be	considered	separately	with	
respect	to	the	role	of	informants.	Space	does	not	permit	this	individual	treatment	here.	Suffice	to	
point	out	three	aspects:	
Many	of	the	early	ethnologists	in	US	American	ethnology	on	its	way	to	cultural	anthropology,	who	
worked	within	the	institutional	frame	of	the	Bureau	of	American	Ethnology	(BAE),	relied	heavily	on	
key	informants.21	In	the	1860s	and	1870s	L.H.	Morgan	and	other	BAE	researchers	worked	closely	with	
American	Indian	subjects.	There	were	two	important	sides	to	this	collaboration:	On	the	one	hand,	it	
remains	somewhat	unclear	to	what	extent	Morgan	and	others	profited	from	and	relied	upon	
interpretative	input	from	local	subjects	without	acknowledging	it.	It	is	hard	to	disentangle	to	what	
extend	epistemic	collaboration	took	place	and	how.	On	the	other	hand,	the	American	Indians	who	
got	involved	certainly	did	not	do	so	without	pursuing	their	own	agenda.	They	were	by	no	means	
naïve	locals	that	could	be	studied	for	a	fictionalised	Indianness,	but	rather	were	actively	involved	in	
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Indian-American	political	conflict.22	Hence	local	informants	did	not	simply	channel	information	to	the	
anthropologist	and	the	anthropologist	did	not	simply	study	a	local	group’s	way	of	life.	Both	acts	were	
closely	related	acts	with	a	more	or	less	open	political-normative	agenda.	They	were	collaborative	
acts	pursuing	shared	goals.	
Other	constellations	in	early	US	American	Ethnology	emphasise	the	epistemic	rather	than	the	
political	aspect	of	collaboration.	In	the	1900-1920s,	Franz	Boas	relied	heavily	on	the	expertise	of	
James	Teit,	a	Scotsman	with	Northwestern	knowledge,	who	enabled	Boas’	work	with	Inuit	groups.	
And	Alice	Cunningham	Fletcher	began	to	acknowledge	Francis	LaFlesche	as	a	co-author	in	her	
extensive	work	on	the	Omaha	tribe.23	LaFlesche	started	as	a	field	assistant	and	interpreter	and	in	the	
end	was	adopted	by	Cunningham	Fletcher	as	her	legal	son.24	These	types	of	collaboration	
disappeared	from	US	American	Ethnology	with	the	professionalization	of	anthropology	and	the	rise	
of	the	methodological	standards	developed	in	British	and	French	social	anthropology.		
In	addition	to	very	close	one-to-one	relationships,	most	fieldwork	relied	on	an	extensive	local	
network	of	other-than-anthropologist	researchers	and	research-affine	supporters.	These	included	
traders,	missionaries,	diplomats	and	many	others.	And	in	the	case	of	large	research	and	trade	
expeditions,	these	also	included	fellow	scientists	from	a	diverse	range	of	disciplines	with	various	
kinds	of	expertise	and	(local)	experience.25	Few	contributions	to	early	anthropology	were	thus	made	
as	individual	efforts.	Rather	the	nature	of	the	epistemic	culture	has	always	been	one	of	manifold	
collaborations	between	researchers	and	various	informants,	including	practical	support,	political	
agendas	and	joint	knowledge	production.		
Two	further	strands	to	this	genealogy	need	to	be	mentioned	at	least	in	passing.	Firstly,	British	social	
anthropology	as	well	as	the	early	German	Volkskunde	and	later	European	Ethnology	have	all	been	
working	historically	and	ethnographically	in	their	home	countries.	The	remoteness	of	the	culture	to	
be	studied	has	never	characterised	these	disciplines	to	the	degree	that	it	has	shaped	US	cultural	
anthropology.	Gluckman	and	colleagues	at	Manchester	challenged	structural	functionalism	with	their	
extended	case	method,	which	informs	much	of	the	long-term	community	studies	conducted	by	
anthropologists	in	the	UK.26	The	major	‘Volkskunde’	projects	in	Germany	such	as	the	1930s	‘Atlas	der	
deutschen	Volkskunde’,	during	the	GDR	era	the	1970s	project	‘Magdeburger	Börde’	or	the	1970s	and	
80s	Southwest	German	long-term	community	project	in	the	village	of	Kiebingen27:	all	of	these	
research	efforts	relied	heavily	on	the	collaboration	with	local	informants.	Yet	these	informants	were	
not	in	any	way	cultural	Other.	While	they	were	not	necessarily	epistemic	partners,	they	were	more	
often	than	not	collaborators	in	a	shared	social	and	cultural	context.	The	question	how	analysis	and	
interpretation	were	distributed	amongst	anthropologists	and	informants,	i.e.	the	question	whose	
analysis	and	interpretation	is	it	anyway	has	largely	remained	a	moot	point.	
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Post-Writing	Culture:	dialogue,	intervention,	collaboration		
Hence	collaboration	is	not	new,	neither	to	early	US	cultural	anthropology	nor	to	various	traditions	of	
European	anthropologies.		Much	that	is	of	relevance	to	collaboration	in	the	later	history	of	the	
discipline	has	already	been	discussed	in	the	context	of	the	crisis	of	representation.	The	‘writing	
culture’	debate	and	particularly	the	many	strands	of	feminist	and	post-colonial	critique	
deconstructed	the	relationships	of	power	and	identity	in	practices	of	fieldwork	and,	most	importantly,	
forms	of	textual	representation	of	the	Other.28	As	George	Marcus	summarises:	“(1)	The	researcher	
subject	distinction	is	problematized	and	re-configured	resulting	in	increasingly	dialogic	ethnographic	
approaches	in	various	modes.	(2)	The	textual	representation	is	broadened	away	from	an	orientation	
on	classic	male	ethnographies	and	towards	a	use	of	different	textual	genres.	(3)	The	politics	of	
representation	thus	become	contested	ground,	so	does	the	one-directional	flow	of	information	from	
field	to	text.”29	The	rise	of	dialogic	approaches	in	1980s	anthropology	as	an	attempt	to	increase	the	
diversity	of	experiences	visible	in	anthropological	representations	was	only	a	beginning.	Over	the	last	
two	decades	a	whole	range	of	engaged,	public,	collaborative,	critical	or	interventionist	approaches	
has	developed	in	anthropology	or	rather	within	a	much	more	open	epistemic	culture	that	includes	
feminist	critique,	gender	and	queer	thinking,	post-colonial	studies,	human	geography,	cultural	and	
urban	studies,	science	and	technology	studies	and	social	and	cultural	anthropology	itself.	
In	most	of	these	approaches,	collaboration	has	been	born	out	of	primarily	ethical	and	political	
concerns.	While	it	is	difficult	to	summarise	such	heterogeneous	movements	and	research	efforts,	
two	elements	appear	to	be	central	to	this	sense	of	collaboration:	First,	it	denies	the	researcher	the	a	
priori	primacy	of	interpretation	over	social	phenomena.	The	negotiation	of	who	may	say	what	about	
whom	becomes	part	of	the	ethnographic	process.	The	researcher	is	primarily	accountable	to	the	field	
of	research.	Second,	the	boundaries	between	analysis,	critique	and	intervention	are	deliberately	
performed	as	blurred.	This	blurring	reaches	from	deprioritising	knowledge	production	altogether	in	
favour	of	political	change30	to	a	forceful	situating	of	knowledge	production	not	only	in	social,	political	
and	historical	but	also	in	biographical,	personal	and	emotional	terms.	Moderate	positions	
acknowledge	this	extensively	situated	nature	of	knowledge	production,	but	emphasise	accountability	
to	a	disciplinary	body	of	knowledge	and	towards	an	institutionalised	set	of	practices.31	
In	summary:	anthropology	today	faces	new	conditions	for	the	social	(re)production	of	
anthropological	knowledge.	More	collaborative	modes	of	knowledge	production	have	been	
suggested	primarily	for	ethical	and	political	reasons,	deconstructing	the	heroic	stories	of	individual	
fieldwork	and	acknowledging	more	fully	the	many	so	far	often	hidden	contributions	from	other	
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disciplines	and	local	informants	alike.	The	epistemic	consequences	of	these	developments,	however,	
have	not	been	fully	thought	through.	As	Boyer	discusses	in	Paul	Radin’s	work,	this	is	about	
epistemically	appreciating	the	social	and	intellectual	constellations	of	knowledge	production:	“[…]	all	
anthropology	is	in	some	ways	already	the	anthropology	of	intellectuals.	Any	process	of	
anthropological	representation	attempts	to	formalize	knowledges	of	another	social	environment	and	
involves	the	cultivation	of	intellectual	exchange	systems	to	mediate	the	acquisition	and	evaluation	of	
local	knowledge.	In	these	exchange	systems,	anthropologists	typically	rely	heavily	upon	the	
intellectual	labors	of	local	knowledge-specialists	who	provide	not	just	testimony	but	rather	cultural	
analyses	that	prefigure	and	orient	the	interests	and	language	of	the	anthropologist	[and	vice	
versa].”32	Appreciating	these	intellectual	labours	changes	the	epistemic	culture	and	the	formats	
within	which	ethnographic	fieldwork	is	conducted.	In	the	following	section,	I	outline	co-laboration	as	
a	way	of	epistemically	acknowledging	these	changing	conditions	of	anthropological	knowledge	
production.	
	
From	collaboration	to	co-laboration	
To	begin	with,	I	want	to	distinguish	co-laboration	from	collaboration.	This	is	a	difficult	and	perhaps	
futile	task,	because	the	notion	of	collaboration	is	being	used	in	very	different	contexts	and	with	very	
different	meanings	and	connotations	as	outlined	in	the	genealogies	above.	My	concern	here	is	solely	
with	a	differentiation	between	co-laboration	as	a	primarily	epistemic	mode	and	collaboration	as	a	
primarily	ethical,	political	and	public	mode	of	anthropological	research.	Public	anthropology	is	
perhaps	the	better	and	most	comprehensive	label	for	a	range	of	collaborative	agendas.	Public	
anthropology’s	essential	argument	is	that	anthropology	ought	to	primarily	strive	to	further	our	public	
rather	than	scientific	understanding	of	human	kind,	activity	and	co-existence.	Anthropology	needs	to	
strive	to	not	only	know	but	to	change	the	world,	to	address	the	manifold	injustices	apparent	to	many	
doing	research	in	the	field	and	to	help	improve	the	living	conditions	of	those	traditionally	positioned	
as	informants.	It	argues	in	favour	of	a	need	“to	serve	humankind	more	directly	and	more	
immediately.	[…]	Collaborative	ethnographic	practice	has	the	potential	to	pull	academic	and	applied	
anthropology,	feminist	and	postmodernist	approaches,	and	Americanist	and	other	anthropological	
traditions	into	the	same	stream,	fashioning	an	engaged	anthropology	that	[…]	‘prob[es]	the	deep	
mysteries	of	the	human	species	and	the	human	soul’	and	encourages	us	to	press	outward,	mobilizing	
our	work	and	ourselves	to	make	a	difference	beyond	the	discipline	and	the	academy.”33	
It	seems	to	me	that	trying	to	systematically	define	engaged,	collaborative,	reflexive	and	scientific	
practices	into	neat	categories	is	an	unproductive	undertaking.	They	occur	in	various	mixtures	in	
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different	contexts	and	projects	and	they	all	together	make	up	anthropology.	I	am,	therefore,	not	
interested	in	demarcating	co-laborative	anthropology	from	applied,	reflexive	or	engaged	
anthropologies	as	a	matter	of	disciplinary	identity.	I	conduct	this	boundary	work	with	collaboration	
here	because	co-laboration	and	collaboration	are	similar	words	and	most	anthropologist	will	know	
collaboration	in	its	public	anthropological	sense.	My	interests	and	intentions	with	co-laboration	have	
some	overlap	with	public	anthropology	but	place	a	different	emphasis.	
I	understand	co-laboration	to	mean	temporary	joint	epistemic	work	with	two	crucial	emphases	that	
distinguish	it	from	collaboration:	(1)	Collaboration	usually	rests	on	a	shared	goal	or	at	least	intention	
–	a	similar	sense	of	being-in-the-world	perhaps.	Hence	collaborators	are	almost	exclusively	people	or	
institutions	that	share	political	or	social	goals	with	the	anthropologist	and	that	now	pool	resources	
and	capabilities	to	achieve	those	goals.	Few	collaborative	projects	are	thus	realised	with	the	
ideological	Other,	e.g.	investment	bankers,	law	firms	or	the	military.	This	seems	to	me	to	be	a	bias	
that	is	hard	to	justify.	Co-laboration	on	the	other	hand	contains	the	concepts	‘labour’	and	
‘laboratory’.	It	is	not	about	a	joint	opus	as	in	cooperation,	but	about	a	shared	process	of	labour.	And	
it	is	always	experimental	in	character:	without	telos.	It	is	about	conducting	joint	epistemic	work,	
experimenting	with	formats,	without	necessary	aiming	for	a	shared	goal.	A	shared	value	system	
within	co-laborative	work	is	common	but	not	a	necessary	prerequisite.	(2)	Co-laboration	is	a	
distinctly	disciplinary	project.	It	is	not	primarily	aimed	at	changing	the	world	or	producing	something	
permanent	in	between	disciplines	or	actors.	It	is	about	experimenting	with	different	ways	of	seeing-	
and	being-in-the-world	with	the	purpose	of	advancing	anthropological	knowledge	production.	It	is	a	
process	designed	to	help	anthropologists	curate	concepts	that	are	good	to	think	with.34	In	the	
following	I	want	to	outline	four	facets	of	this	co-laborative	mode	of	knowledge	production.	
	
From	reflexive	anthropology	to	anthropological	reflexivities	
Anthropology	is	centrally	concerned	with	understanding	the	production	of	categories	and	their	social	
consequences	and	efficacy.	As	such	it	is	at	its	core	a	reflexive	discipline	that	derives	its	epistemic	
momentum	from	using	scientific	and	native	concepts	critically	rather	than	applying	them	in	a	positive	
fashion	only.	Anthropological	analysis	applies	concepts,	but	anthropological	representations	always	
afford	the	critique	and	development	of	these	concepts.	This	is	not	unique	to	anthropology.	Most	
disciplines	harbour	at	least	a	small	section,	usually	labelled	history	and	theory	of	that	discipline,	that	
is	primarily	concerned	with	situating	and	critiquing	the	dominant	thought	styles	within	the	
disciplinary	collectives.	What	is	relatively	unique	to	anthropology	is	the	fact	that	this	iridescence	
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between	positive	and	reflexive	conceptual	work	is	standard	practice	within	its	main	method:	
ethnography.	
The	difficulty	arises	when	this	reflexivity	solidifies	into	a	gesture,	a	“professional	self-critique”	of	“the	
disciplinary	pretension	ever	to	have	produced	anything	that	could	count	as	genuine	knowledge	given	
the	prevailing	ethics	of	anthropological	connectivity”35	–	what	Boyer	describes	as	the	downsides	of	
second	generation	reflexivity.	Boyer	rightly	points	out	that	‘reflexive	anthropology’	(as	opposed	to	an	
engaged	anthropology)	cannot	be	a	subfield	of	anthropology.36	Anthropological	reflexivity,	however,	
is	increasingly	central	to	the	discipline	“as	part	of	the	transformation	and	pluralization	of	social	
knowledge	formation	in	Western	intellectual	cultures.	Reflexivity	[…]	is	not,	or	not	only,	a	voluntary	
condition	of	intellectual	practice	(e.g.,	a	particular	critical	or	analytical	disposition	one	chooses)	but	
also	an	ideological	reflection	of	the	growing	phenomenological	and	epistemological	salience	of	
contingency	of	intellectual	culture.”	Boyer	argues	that	anthropologists	need	to	be	aware	of	the	
conditions	and	practices	of	the	social	reproduction	of	knowledge	and	how	these	interact	with	their	
fieldwork	and	their	own	knowledge	production.	
Reflexivity	in	this	sense	has	nothing	to	do	with	the	search	for	a	normative	scale.	Instead,	reflexivity	is	
understood	as	an	experiential	and	experimental	problem,	as	curiosity	how	and	why	‘they’	and	‘I’	are	
interested	in	what	we	are	and	how	we	are	interested	in	it.37	It	is	the	primary	purpose	of	co-laborative	
anthropology	to	produce	spaces,	formats	and	modes	of	knowledge	production	that	enable	this	kind	
of	reflexivity.	This	crucially	depends	on	moving	away	from	the	model	of	the	individual	project	as	the	
standard	mode	of	anthropological	knowledge	production.	The	individual	project	rests	“on	a	myth	of	
sui	generis	intellectual	production.	The	individual	project	model	assumes	that	interpretive	and	
authorial	virtuosity	is	the	mainspring	of	good	work.“38	In	co-laborative	anthropology	the	emphasis	is	
instead	on	mobility	in	the	all-encompassing	sense	Hirschauer	addresses:	mobility	within	research	
fields,	within	empirical	material,	between	material,	literature	and	research	question	and	between	
colleagues.39	This	mobility	produces	the	iridescence	between	field,	material	and	theoretical	concepts	
that	is	anthropology’s	signature	mode	of	knowledge	production.	It	enables	conceptual	work	within	
and	through	empirical	materials.	
To	go	one	step	further	means	trying	to	work	within	and	through	empirical	materials	already	as	part	
of	the	mise-en-scène	of	fieldwork	itself.	This	raises	the	idea	of	the	para-site	as	experimental	and	
epistemic	encounter	and	way	of	“doing	theory	in	continuous	relation	to	the	distinctly	non-‘meta’	
immersive	quality	of	thinking	during	fieldwork”40:	
The	para-site	is	thus	a	kind	of	deliberate	experimental	interruption	or	‘disruption’	in	the	field	
research	process	with	the	intent	of	staging	a	reflexive	(and	potentially	collaborative)	encounter	
between	research	partners:	‘It	embraces	the	opportunity	to	deal	in	unsettled	working	
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concepts,	analytic	strategies,	and	ethnographic	ways	of	thinking	that	the	fieldworker	may	
appropriate	critically	for	her	own	eventual	individual	purposes.’”41	
	
Para-sites	are	designed	in	the	hope	of	producing	reflexive	interventions.	My	notion	of	co-laboration	
is	largely	congruent	but	for	one	aspect:	I	do	believe	that	co-laboration	is	about	developing	and	
experimenting	with	different	reflexivities	or	rather	ways	of	being	or	becoming	reflexive.	While	there	
is	a	clear	sense	within	the	debate	that	a	mentalistic	notion	of	reflexivity	misses	the	point,	many	of	
the	alternative	strategies	nevertheless	focus	on	thinking	and	on	language.	Boyer,	for	example,	
suggests	the	vernacularisation	of	anthropological	language	as	an	important	step	towards	broadening	
anthropological	connectivity	and	hence	collaborative	reflexivity.	I	could	not	agree	more.	Yet	I	think	
we	need	to	go	beyond	language	and	consider	a	whole	range	of	different	ways	of	being-in-the-world	
that	foster	different	ways	of	becoming	reflexive	–	of	‘reflexing’	if	you	will.	There	is	no	reason	why	
anthropologists	should	operate	only	within	the	framework	of	fieldwork	instead	of	trying	out	
experimentally	different	ways	of	seeing-	and	being-in-the-world.	This	includes	first	and	foremost	
different	modes	of	data	gathering	and	analysis:	seeing	like	a	survey,	seeing	like	a	statistical	model	or	
seeing	like	remote	sensor	on	a	satellite	all	provide	different	experiences	of	being-in-the-world,	
suggest	different	ways	of	problematizing	world	and	thus	also	broaden	interpretative	flexibility.	And	
there	is	no	reason	why	co-laborators	should	not	go	beyond	talking	to	anthropologists	but	also	trying	
different	methods	of	field	research	to	appreciate	how	anthropology	problematizes	phenomena.	
	
From	critical	distance	to	experimental	worlding	
The	notion	of	critique	is	intricately	tied	to	the	debate	about	reflexivity.	Labelling	an	approach	in	
anthropology	‘critical’	is	common.	‘Critical	research	on	X’	usually	means	that	X	is	already	being	
researched	by	other	disciplines	(or	known	more	generally	by	powerful	actors	or	discourses).	Usually,	
these	are	disciplines	that	produce	positive	knowledge	about	X	such	as	economics,	law	or	psychology.	
They	are	disciplines	operating	within	a	strong	theoretical	and	methodological	framework	that	
produce	authoritative	narratives	about	X.	In	their	mainstream,	they	tend	not	to	be	curious	about	
how	they	have	come	to	be	interested	in	X	and	why	in	this	particular	way.	They	appear	to	lack	
reflexivity.42	‘Critical	research	on	X’	attempts	to	introduce	this	reflexivity	to	the	study	of	X.	Co-
laborative	anthropology	shares	this	intention,	yet	it	suggests	a	different	practice.	Critical	research	
commonly	draws	on	a	dialectic	tradition.	Its	critical	momentum	resides	within	the	deconstructive	
move	that	reveals	the	contingency	of	the	hegemonic	representations	of	X.	Reflexivity	here	is	the	
ability	to	stand	back	from	X,	to	achieve	critical	distance.	This	entails	taking	the	hegemonic	
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representations	of	X	at	face	value	and	revealing	their	contingency	vis-à-vis	alternatives.	Reflexivity	
means	having	access	to	an	epistemological	meta-level	of	analysis	at	which	the	insufficiency	of	the	
current	way	of	organising	and	representing	X	becomes	visible.	Such	practices	of	being	critical	are	
often	radical	in	the	sense	that	they	operate	with	utopian	alternatives	and	a	strong	normative	scale.	
They	are	important	in	anthropology,	because	they	open	up	spaces	for	thought.	They	are,	however,	
ill-suited	for	co-laborative	work,	because	co-laboration	with	fields	requires	operating	closely	to	the	
relevances	and	logics	of	these	fields	rather	than	starting	from	an	outright	negation	of	these	aspects.		
Critique	within	a	mode	of	co-laboration	relies	on	reflexivity	as	curiosity	about	the	genealogies	and	
the	performativities	of	theories,	concepts	and	methods	used	to	represent	X.	It	is	less	concerned	with	
thick	description	in	a	Geertzian	sense,	deconstruction	or	identity	politics.43	It	resists	the	temptation	
to	operate	with	an	epistemological	meta-level,	but	rather	stays	within	the	practices	on	the	ground	
trying	to	develop	a	generative	mode	of	critique.44	It	operates	within	the	very	ecologies	of	practice	
that	it	studies.45		
My	conviction	that	this	mode	of	critique	is	important	for	anthropology	today	stems	from	two	
concerns:	The	first	one	comes	from	French	anthropologist	Bruno	Latour.	He	is	making	the	simple	but	
powerful	point	that	political	processes	in	knowledge	societies	tend	to	be	understood	as	processes	of	
representation.46	Hence	knowledge,	i.e.	facts,	are	produced	within	the	sciences	and	are	then	
debated	within	political	processes.	Instead	of	focusing	on	the	political	life	of	facts,	Latour	demands,	
the	analysis	should	move	forward	to	matters	of	concern,	i.e.	an	investigation	of	the	political	nature	of	
practices	of	fact-making.	I	find	this	to	be	a	powerful	argument	and	it	is	not	only	about	fact	
production.	It	is	more	generally	about	the	question	how	phenomena	are	problematized	in	knowledge	
economies.	How	do	certain	phenomena	come	to	be	known	and	come	to	be	a	problem?	Rather	than	
being	critical	about	the	dominant	representations	of	X,	co-laborative	critique	is	curious	about	how	X	
has	come	to	be	X	and	how	and	why	it	stays	X.		
The	notion	of	representation	needs	adjusting	in	light	of	debates	at	the	intersection	of	feminist	
science	and	technology	studies	(STS)	and	anthropology.	Representation	assumes	that	a	relevant	
reality	exists	outside	of	its	specific	epistemic	representation.	Ethnographic,	practice-theoretical	and	
performative	thinking	in	STS	insists	that	scientific	knowledge	has	ontological	consequences.47	
Knowledge	loops	and	in	the	process	makes	up	people	and	worlds.48	Karen	Barad	thus	even	speaks	of	
‘phenomena’	as	the	primary	analytical	and	ontological	unit	in	the	world:		
The	primary	ontological	unit	is	not	independent	objects	with	inherent	boundaries	and	
properties	but	rather	phenomena.	In	my	agential	realist	elaboration,	phenomena	do	not	merely	
mark	the	epistemological	inseparability	of	observer	and	observed,	or	the	results	of	
measurements;	rather,	phenomena	are	the	ontological	inseparability/entanglement	of	intra-
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acting	agencies.	That	is,	phenomena	are	ontologically	primitive	relations	-	relations	without	pre-
existing	relata.49		
	
Knowledge	production	is	thus	much	more	than	the	representation	of	a	separable	world.	It	is	
material-semiotic	practice	and	as	such	deeply	situated	within	‘culture’	as	practice	–	like	a	string	
figure.50	Anthropologist	Anna	Tsing	takes	her	cue	from	this	thinking	to	introduce	the	notion	of	
worlding	as	the	“always	experimental	and	partial,	and	often	quite	wrong,	attribution	of	world-like	
characteristics	to	scenes	of	social	encounter.”51	Thought	styles	can	thus	be	usefully	understood	not	
as	trivial	machines	of	representation	but	as	patterns	of	practice	constituting	relations	such	that	they	
gain	world-like	characteristics.	
It	seems	sensible	to	me	to	broaden	Latour’s	analysis	of	matters	of	concern	with	its	emphasis	on	the	
politics	of	fact-making	to	the	analysis	of	(the	politics	of)	worlding.	Much	of	that	worlding	happens	not	
at	the	level	of	hegemonic	representation	or	discourse	but	in	what	we	might	call	infrastructural	
practices	and	debates,	i.e.	highly	technical,	scientific,	legal	and	economic	debates	and	processes	that	
are	rarely	accessed	by	anthropology.	Traditional	ethnographic	fieldwork	tends	to	come	in	further	
downstream,	when	problems	arise,	because	a	dominant	worlding	does	not	fit	lives	as	lived.	Critique	
then	often	means	pointing	out	this	misfit.	Co-laborative	critique	wants	to	move	upstream	into	the	
infrastructural	practices	to	ask	about	the	legitimacy	of	choices	that	are	made	during	
infrastructuring.52	This	is	not	radical	critique	from	an	epistemologically	privileged	standpoint.	It	is	co-
laborative	critique	within	the	practices,	relevances	and	logics	of	the	field.		
My	second	argument	in	support	of	an	alternative	notion	of	critique	takes	me	to	Dutch	empirical	
philosopher	Annemarie	Mol	and	while	it	is	somewhat	polemic	and	provocative,	it	illustrates	well	the	
concerns	outlined	above.	Mol	argues	that	what	really	happens	when	one	views	phenomena	from	a	
critical	distance	is	that	they	become	smaller.	Less	detail	is	visible.	Things	may	even	go	out	of	focus.53	
This	emphasises	Hirschauer’s	point	about	reflexivity	as	mobility.	The	anthropologist	is	no	longer	
modest	witness	with	access	to	another	plane	of	epistemological	truth.54	She	rather	relies	on	modest	
‘withness’	as	the	sine	qua	non	of	reflexivity.55	Critical	distance	is	replaced	with	comparative	
involvement.56	Putting	different	worldings	next	to	each	other,	relating	them	to	each	other,	becomes	
the	basis	for	reflexive	knowledge	production	and	hence	for	critical	engagement	with	and	through	X.	
Co-laborative	anthropology	is	about	constructing	spaces	or	processes	that	allow	anthropologists	to	
try	out	and	experiment	with	different	worldings.	This	is	necessarily	incomplete	and	it	is	not	meant	in	
any	existential	or	deeply	phenomenological	sense.	Neither	is	it	simply	about	dialogue.	It	is	about	
trying	out	methods,	ways	of	seeing	the	world,	experiencing	new	phenomena	in	Barad’s	sense,	i.e.	
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changing	the	mediators	that	relate	and	entangle	observer	and	observed.	It	is	about	experiencing	and	
experimenting	with	worldings	other	than	seeing-like-an-ethnographer.57	The	epistemic	momentum	
lies	in	the	comparative	involvement	in,	with	and	through	different	worldings.	Thus	co-laborative	
anthropology	is	about	bringing	people	together	who	in	their	normal	lives	are	involved	in	different	
worldings,	i.e.	who	are	situated	differently	vis-à-vis	social	phenomena	or	who	contextualise	
phenomena	altogether	differently,	because	of	method,	theory	or	walk	of	life.	Rabinow	makes	the	
important	point	that	co-laborative	work	need	not	be	restricted	to	work	amongst	scientists:	
I'm	ethically	convinced	and	committed	to	the	fact	that	if	you	go	across	the	street	and	talk	to	
any	group	of	people,	you're	going	to	find	reflective	people	there.	The	guys	who	work	in	the	
labs	or	the	patients	that	Rayna	Rapp	studies	are	not	themselves	doing	science	–	they're	not	
technicians	of	general	ideas	–	but	they're	reflective	about	their	lives,	and	their	lives	are	cut	
by	these	scientific	or	legal	or	financial	vectors	of	truth	claims.58	
	
This	makes	clear	that	co-laborative	anthropology	addresses	its	former	informants	differently.	They	
are	not	experts	in	the	sense	of	keepers	of	specialised	knowledges	and	they	are	not	naïve	experts	of	
their	own	everyday	lives.	They	are	able	to	reflect	about	how	their	own	lives	are	cut	by	different	
worldings.	In	this	way,	they	are	experts	and	good	to	think	with	about	which	worldings	are	significant	
worldings	of	the	contemporary	and	how.	Importantly,	this	does	not	privilege	their	analysis	and	
interpretation	as	was	often	the	case	in	the	ethically	motivated	‘giving	voice’	type	of	collaboration.	
Rather	their	analysis	and	interpretation	of	the	world	is	being	juxtaposed	or	diffracted	in	co-
laboration	with	the	researchers’	terms	and	positions.	The	result	may	be	something	co-laborators	
share.	More	likely,	however,	all	participants	will	learn	their	own	lessons	from	such	processes	and	
revise	their	interpretations	of	empirical	material	accordingly.		
	
From	interdisciplinarity	to	experimental	entanglements	
All	kinds	of	collaborative	research	are	being	promoted	recently	under	the	label	of	trans-	and	
interdisciplinarity,	mode	2	knowledge	production	or	co-production.	One	cannot	help	but	agree	with	
Des	Fitzgerald	and	Felicity	Callard	who	refer	to	this	rhetoric	of	interdisciplinarity	as	“arid”.59	The	
‘regime	of	the	inter-‘	holds	little	promise	for	exciting	intellectual	advances.	It	is	largely	driven	by	the	
need	to	acquire	research	funding	and,	at	the	level	of	science	policy,	it	represents	a	strong	trend	that	
ostensibly	corresponds	with	promoting	a	type	of	science	that	pretends	to	be	closer	to	the	real	
problems	in	the	world;	problems,	which	often	upset	the	established	intellectual	division	of	labour.60	
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Co-laborative	anthropology	has	thus	little	to	do	with	building	research	consortia,	strategic	alliances,	
synergistic	research	development	or	an	additive	understanding	of	knowledge.	
While	the	rhetoric	of	interdisciplinarity	has	little	to	offer	to	a	co-laborative	agenda,	a	different	
picture	emerges	from	a	look	at	the	role	of	ethnography	in	projects	that	cross	the	boundary	between	
natural	and	social	science.	In	an	analysis	of	such	efforts,	British	sociologist	Andrew	Barry	and	his	
colleagues	distinguish	three	modes	of	interdisciplinary	collaboration:	an	integrative-synthesis	mode	
aimed	at	adding	expertise	up	to	a	more	comprehensive	understanding;	a	subordination-service	
mode	where	one	discipline	provides	external	expertise	to	solve	a	disciplinary	problem;	and	an	
agonistic-antagonistic	mode.	This	latter	mode	operates	in	a	logic	of	ontology	and	is	characterised	by	
one	discipline	trying	to	change	the	ontological	status	of	the	object	of	research	in	another	discipline.61	
For	example,	anthropology	may	try	to	infuse	the	life	sciences	with	a	more	social	understanding	of	the	
individual.	This	is	an	attractive	proposition	and	one	that	moves	away	from	the	arid	rhetoric	of	
interdisciplinarity	towards	a	collaborative	ethnographic	agenda.	Yet	it	falls	short	of	a	co-laborative	
effort	for	two	reasons:	(1)	It	is	one	discipline	deciding	for	itself	that	it	wants	to	change	the	ontological	
status	of	an	object	of	research	in	another.	The	decision	to	do	so	and	how	to	do	it	does	not	derive	
from	a	co-laborative	process	between	the	two	disciplines.	Many	projects	in	STS	take	this	form.	They	
are	rooted	within	a	deconstructive	critique	but	by	turning	their	revelation	of	contingency	into	
propositions	for	the	field,	they	hope	to	produce	a	productive	intervention.	This	approach	rests	very	
much	on	the	genius	of	the	individual	researcher,	because	the	task	of	convincing	another	epistemic	
culture	to	change	its	thought	style	is	immense.	(2)	A	co-laborative	effort	is	not	a	teleological	process.	
It	does	not	pursue	a	shared	goal	or	follow	a	clearly	defined	strategy.	It	is	an	open	process	amongst	
technicians	of	general	ideas	willing	to	experiment	with	different	ways	of	worlding.	One	thing	that	
may	come	of	such	co-laborative	efforts	is	a	change	in	thought	style,	which	a	participant	may	take	
back	into	her	or	his	own	epistemic	culture	as	a	Widerstandsaviso,	i.e.	as	an	element	of	resistance	
against	the	dominant	thought	style	within	a	particular	thought	collective.62	
Hence	thinking	through	co-laboration	in	current	(inter-)disciplinary	terms	is	difficult.	I	am	much	more	
taken	by	the	suggestion	of	‘experimental	entanglements’.	63	“Experimental	entanglements	are	
modest,	often	awkward,	typically	unequal	encounters	that	work	to	mobilize	specific	and	often	
serendipitous	moments	of	potential	novelty	in	and	outside	the	laboratory.”	They	“refuse	preliminary	
decisions	about	the	shape	or	outcome	of	such	an	interaction	[…],	denote	an	ad	hoc	process	of	
shuffling	histories,	methods,	and	assumptions	[and]	are	thus	never	not	temporary,	local	assemblages	
of	motivation,	interest,	people	and	machinery	–	in	which	we,	and	our	collaborators,	are	able	
momentarily	to	think	something	exterior	to	both	the	conventions	of	experimental	practice,	and	the	
taken-for-granted	dynamics	of	epistemic	power	that	underwrite	its	conduct.”	Fitzgerald	and	Callard	
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(F&G)	work	on	the	basis	of	their	own	entanglements	in	the	neurosciences.	With	the	notion	of	
‘experiment’	they	literally	mean	experiments	in	the	sense	of	laboratory	experiments	rather	than	in	a	
looser	sense	of	tinkering	with	a	fixed	and	controlled	set	of	ingredients.	One	might	argue	that	
experiments	are	anything	but	the	open	processes	that	F&G	want	them	to	be	in	order	to	produce	
these	multifarious	affordances.64	STS	has	spent	considerable	time	showing	how	experiments	trim	
nature	on	the	basis	of	prior	expectations	such	that	the	experimental	outcome	must	lie	along	a	
narrow	dimension	to	which	the	experimental	measurement	apparatus	is	attuned.	Yet	F&G	take	their	
cue	from	Rheinberger	and	his	reading	of	the	experiment	as	a	space	that	must	contain	
epistemological	and	ontological	excess	to	succeed,	i.e.	contain	layers,	remnants	and	traces	of	
alternative	worldings.	It	is	these	traces	that	F&G	treat	as	affordances.	These	affordances	are	explored	
within	a	more	open	process	that	develops	from	the	encounter	of	several	participants	each	willing	to	
treat	an	experiment	not	only	as	a	positive	fact-producing	machine,	but	also	as	something	akin	to	
Deleuzian	desire	machines:	continuously	reintroducing	contained	excess	to	the	wild	in	unexpected	
places	and	modes.65	Andreas	Roepstorff	and	his	colleagues	capture	this	productive	moment	of	
experimenting	at	the	intersection	of	anthropology	and	neuroscience	by	distinguishing	experiment	as	
method,	object	of	research	and	aesthetic	of	research	practice.66	This	aesthetic	emphasises	doing	
research	together,	using	texts	and	tools	together,	analysing	and	writing	together,	while	always	being	
alert	to	emerging	trajectories	and	reflexive	about	one’s	own	practice	as	well	as	the	social	
reproduction	of	these	practices.	Roepstorff	suggests	that	this	approach	to	experimental	
entanglement	would	not	need	to	be	called	neuroanthropology	or	follow	in	any	other	way	the	‘regime	
of	the	inter-’.	It	would	simply	be	anthropology.	
	
Conclusion:	crafting	a	widerstandsaviso	
The	physician,	microbiologist	and	philosopher	of	science	Ludwik	Fleck	in	his	1935	book	“Genesis	and	
Development	of	a	Scientific	Fact”	coined	the	phrase	Widerstandsaviso.67		A	Widerstandsaviso68	is	a	
point	of	resistance	that	arises	from	‘reality’	within	the	practices	of	a	thought	collective.	It	is	the	world	
kicking	back,	in	today’s	STS	parlance.69	Fleck	envisages	epistemic	work	to	proceed	from	chaotic	
thinking	through	an	increasing	thought	constraint	towards	a	directly	recognisable	Gestalt:	the	
scientific	fact	(Tatsache)	always	defined	in	relation	to	a	particular	thought	collective	and	a	particular	
thought	style.	The	Widerstandsaviso	is	the	initial	kernel	of	resistance	to	thought	caprice	and	thus	the	
beginning	of	a	journey	towards	a	fact.		
In	my	mind,	co-laborative	research	is	about	crafting	Widerstandsavisos	that	work	the	other	way	
around.	The	co-laborative	Widerstandsaviso	is	the	kernel	of	resistance	that	increases	thought	caprice	
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against	the	thought	constraint	in	the	existing	collective.	This	is	not	straightforward	intervention.	It	is	
not	teleological	and	it	is	not	about	providing	answers	for	a	discipline.	To	the	contrary:	it	is	about	
providing	different	problematisations	and	different	questions.	It	is	about	re-establishing	moments	of	
thought	caprice.	It	is	about	providing	a	space	for	co-laborative	research	within	which	seeds	of	
resistance	and	seeds	of	reflexivity	are	produced,	which	may	become	generatively	irritating	when	
taken	back	to	their	respective	thought	collectives	or	epistemic	cultures.	It	is	then	up	to	the	collectives	
to	adjust	their	thought	style	such	that	the	irritation	subsides	–	or	not	as	the	case	may	be.	The	
Widerstandsaviso	must	not	be	confused	with	the	tactical	resistance	of	the	subaltern	against	
hegemonic	ideology,	discourse	or	regime.	While	it	shares	some	political	sympathies	with	these	
approaches,	it	is	restricted	to	epistemic	cultures	and	knowledge	production	rather	than	social	action	
in	general	and	it	is	certainly	not	grounded	in	epistemic	certainties.		
For	the	anthropologist,	co-laboration	is	about	building	a	Widerstandsaviso	to	take	back	into	
anthropology.	This	is	what	I	mean	when	I	argue	that	co-laborative	work	for	me	is	a	distinctly	
disciplinary	project.	In	the	case	of	anthropology	co-labouring	with	the	life	sciences,	this	may	be	about	
another	understanding	of	the	role	of	materiality	in	shaping	human	co-existence.	For	example:	
Learning	within	a	co-laborative	process	with	molecular	biology	about	the	inheritability	of	
materialised	forms	of	social	difference	may	lead	an	anthropologist	to	challenge	Bourdieusian	social	
theory	and	its	a-material	understanding	of	habitus	and	hysteresis.70	Co-labouring	with	earth	and	
geoscientists	on	social-ecological	transformations	may	force	anthropologists	to	consider	the	
importance	of	spatial	explicitness	in	the	analysis	of	material-semiotic	practice	or	think	through	how	
patterns	of	practice	may	be	analysed	when	having	to	move	across	scales.	Many	other	examples	
already	exist.71	And,	of	course,	there	is	always	the	hope	that	the	participating	fields	may	change	for	
the	better	in	the	sense	that	the	co-laborative	effort	will	lead	to	something	that	can	be	taken	back	to	
their	discipline	and	that	their	thought	style	will	adjust	in	line	with	anthropological	theory	and	
reasoning.	Neuroscientists	may	try	to	produce	fMRI	experiments	that	account	for	the	embodied	and	
social	nature	of	communication.72	Geoscientists	may	begin	to	care	about	theories	of	globalisation,	
exchange	and	practice	developed	in	anthropology.	
These	are	just	some	suggestions	from	my	own	work	and	the	work	of	my	close	colleagues.	It	is	
important	not	to	understand	them	as	teleological	processes.	Recounting	them	as	a	coherent	
narrative	makes	it	sound	as	if	these	projects	were	strategic	efforts	set-up	with	a	clearly	identified	
research	desideratum	and	research	programme.	This	could	not	be	further	from	what	actually	
happens	in	co-laboration.	All	of	these	projects	have	emerged	from	continuous	encounters	between	
different	technicians	of	general	ideas:	reading	groups,	joint	empirical	work,	visiting	conferences	
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together,	writing	together,	designing	and	conducting	experiments	together	and	–	all	too	rarely	–	
sharing	a	meal	and	talking	about	something	else	but	science.	
Co-laborative	anthropology	is	difficult	research	and	it	is	demanding	on	anthropologists.	It	requires	
anthropologists	to	work	themselves	deeply	into	the	logics	and	experiences	of	often	highly	specialised	
fields	of	expertise.	It	also	requires	effort	and	good	fortune	to	find	people	in	those	fields	who	are	
interested	in	acting	as	technicians	of	general	ideas.	It	demands	that	the	anthropologists	have	their	
own	framework	of	analysis	and	interpretation	challenged	by	other	‘technicians	of	general	ideas’	and	
seriously	confront	those	comfort	zones	of	theorising	and	critique.	And	it	requires	the	material	
resources	to	create	spaces	and	formats	that	afford	the	emergence	of	Widerstandsavisos.	Most	
importantly,	it	requires	time	to	build	relationships	and	by	time	I	mean	many	years	of	ongoing	
interaction.	Only	through	time	can	relationships	develop	wherein	researchers	are	prepared	to	push	
aside	the	everyday	pressures	of	university-based	science,	suspend	their	scepticism	towards	the	
respective	Other	and	engage	in	joint	epistemic	work.	Scholars	are	only	just	beginning	to	chart	the	
different	practices	with	which	people	are	experimenting	and	it	will	be	some	time	before	it	becomes	
clear	what	this	mode	of	anthropological	knowledge	production	may	have	to	offer	to	the	discipline.73	I	
hope	it	will	strengthen	anthropological	reflexivities	and	infuse	the	discipline	with	some	ideas	that	are	
good	to	think	with.	In	any	case:	I	am	convinced	that	many	of	the	important	anthropological	questions	
today	require	co-laborative	efforts.	As	Paul	Rabinow	says:	thickness	today	is	localised	differently.74	It	
is	not	adequately	captured	by	individual	fieldwork	and	it	is	not	addressed	by	collaboration.	Perhaps	
co-laboration	can	help	to	produce	the	anthropological	reflexivities	necessary	to	retain	thick	inquiry	
as	the	signature	mode	of	anthropological	knowledge	production.	
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